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 This paper introduces recent fundamental changes in Japan’s political economy, 
and analyzes how these have affected the country’s industrial architecture in terms of 
business group organization. Whereas previously, long-term, stable relations with other 
firms, banks and shareholders afforded great advantage to many companies, the new 
dynamic environment has led more and more banks and companies to turn away from 
stable “insurance” arrangements. The paper shows that a revision of corporate law 
towards more managerial flexibility paired with broader powers by shareholders matches 
this shift towards greater transparency, accountability, and competitive strategic 
positioning. Therefore, processes of corporate governance are also greatly altered. Our 
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 From the heydays of Japan research in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we have 
established a “perceived wisdom” on how Japanese business works. Aggressive 
government policies geared towards fast export-led economic growth formed the 
backdrop to a particular “industrial architecture” (Lincoln/Gerlach 2004), consisting of 
clearly specified relations among large firms as main pillars, small firms as supporting 
staff, and banks as central operators of finance. Government policies consisted of 
regulated interest rates to lower the cost of borrowing for large firms, subsidies and tax 
measures supportive of a high rate of investment, and trade policies to protect infant 
industries and facilitate cooperative arrangements in innovation and technological 
“catch-up”. Because new entry was limited and technology policy managed such that all 
incumbents had access to new innovation streams, from this developed a stable 
competitive hierarchy, with a set of clearly identified leaders in each market segment.  
 The core of this industrial architecture were the so-called six horizontal keiretsu 
(inter-market business groups), whose preferential trade relations were cemented through 
cross-shareholdings anchored by a main bank that fulfilled three important functions: to 
provide smooth access to finance even to the most highly leveraged firms (by providing 
loans, and by acting as a delegated monitor, thus inviting loans from other banks as well); 
to monitor management based on superior insights into the company’s operations; and to 
structure a coordinated workout should a company encounter serious trouble, so as to 
avoid bankruptcy and ensure the company’s longevity (and thereby maintaining the 
competitive hierarchy). Disclosure rules and other regulation were geared towards 
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supporting informal workouts and other problem-solving. From this developed a peculiar 
setting for corporate governance based on internal processes, with the stock and bonds 
markets as well as the courts assuming the roles of rarely used sidekicks.1
 For the manager of a Japanese firm during the postwar period of the 1950s 
through the early 1990s, this industrial architecture created strong pressures to invest and 
grow constantly. Low costs of borrowing meant that in order to uphold a certain market 
share in a fast-growing market, firms had to invest at least as much as their competitors 
(Abegglen/Stalk 1985). Moreover, the system of lifetime employment that developed 
during the early part of the period turned a substantial portion of labor into a fixed cost, 
such that the breakeven point for firms was comparatively very high. In this setting, every 
sale that earned a positive income – however small – was desirable. Banks, too, were 
more interested in steady sales revenues than they were in profits, because their main 
interest was to collect interest on the significant amount of loans outstanding. The highly 
leveraged companies with high fixed costs operating in an environment of rapid 
technological “catch-up” had as their biggest concern survival.2  
 During the postwar period, the main vehicle most of Japan’s largest companies 
chose to reduce the risk of failure was to tie up with a certain bank and a certain business 
group. By joining one of the “Big Six” industrial groups, companies bought insurance 
against stock market fluctuations, precipitous drops in sales, and financial uncertainty. 
                                                 
1 See Lincoln/Gerlach (2004) for the leading study on keiretsu; Hoshi/Kashyap (2001) and Aoki et al (1994) 
on the main bank system. On the policies of the “developmental state”, see, among others, Johnson (1982), 
Komiya et al (1988), Patrick/Rosovsky (1976), Calder (1988, 1993), Pempel (1998), and Schaede (2000). 
Technology policies and R&D consortia are evaluated by Anchordoguy (1989), Callon (1995), 
Goto/Wakasugi (1998), Lynn (1998), Noble (1989), and Okimoto (1989). Whether industrial and 
technology policies were indeed successful has been hotly debated but is not of prime interest here: no one 
denies that these policies were attempted throughout the postwar period, and accordingly they formed the 
setting in which large companies formulated their corporate strategies. 
2 See Schaede (forthcoming) for an in-depth analysis of corporate strategy in the setting of postwar 
industrial policies.  
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The first was accomplished by engaging in cross-shareholdings with other group 
members such that although a single firm’s ownership stake in each of the other 
companies was rather small, taken together all group firms owned between 20% to 30% 
of total group equity outstanding, meaning that the group was close to a majority 
shareholder. The second piece of insurance was provided by preferential trade relations: 
group firms would purchase preferentially from other group firms, even when (or 
precisely when) a group member was overpriced or in trouble, thus helping the company 
to stay afloat and turn things around. And finally, each group comprised a set of core 
financial institutions that guaranteed access to credit and were large shareholders. 
 However, the fundamental changes in Japan’s political economy between 1998 
and 2006 have turned this business logic on its head, and a reorientation of corporate law 
has altered incentives, liberties and constraints faced by Japanese managers. Shareholder 
rights have been greatly strengthened. So crucial are these changes that they constitute a 
“strategic inflection point” (Burgelman/Grove 1996), meaning that the old ways of doing 
things have been irreversibly transformed. What it used to take to win does no longer 
promise success. Accordingly, in the early 21st century many Japanese companies have 
begun to reformulate their corporate strategies, in a process referred to as “choose and 
focus” (sentaku to shūchū). This term refers to strategies of corporate unbundling through 
reorganization and spin-offs, and concentration on the core business, sometimes through 
acquiring or merging with competitors. As a result, a process was set in motion away from 
high diversification (the previous dominant strategy) towards a concentration on core 
competences with more careful and guarded diversification around that core. In the 
process of making this change, many of the central features of the postwar industrial 
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architecture are being replaced with processes more conducive to aggressive global 
competition in a much more dynamic setting.  
 This paper begins with analyzing the strategic inflection point of 1998, triggered 
by the severe banking crisis of 1998 that greatly affected the entire banking industry and 
economy, as well as the relation between banks and their clients. Efforts to avert a 
financial meltdown contributed to an already ongoing process of dramatic shifts in 
regulation that began in 1998 and culminated in a new Corporation Law in May 2006. 
Next, the paper provides evidence of the decline in keiretsu cohesion and the unwinding 
of cross-shareholdings. As banks and companies began to disentangle their ownership ties, 
two new categories of investors have assumed dominant position among Japan’s 
shareholders: Japanese institutional investors and foreign funds. Banks are being replaced 
in their role of main corporate “monitors” by institutional investors, and this has affected 
the underlying logic of corporate governance and accordingly corporate strategies by 
Japanese firms. Our existing understanding of Japan’s industrial architecture has become 
outdated and needs to be updated to the new Japanese market environment of the 21st 
century. 
 
2.  The Transformation: Banking Crisis and Legal Reform 
 
 The fundamental reorientation of the legal framework for business, and with it 
the processes of regulation and oversight, set in with the banking crisis of 1998, during 
which Japan came perilously close to a financial meltdown. The combination of crisis, 
true market pressures towards change in the form of globalization, and political willpower 
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as exerted by Prime Minister Koizumi led to a series of reforms that were unprecedented 
in their reach and impact.3 As for the crisis, by 1997 the huge losses incurred by banks as 
a result of financial and real estate speculation in the bubble years (1987-1991) could no 
longer be downplayed. With the bankruptcy of two large financial institutions in 
November 1997, most large banks faced great difficulties to reach the capital adequacy 
ratio of 8% as required by the Basel Accord for banks operating internationally. Had any 
large bank dropped below this ratio, it would most likely have folded, potentially causing 
a bank run. 
 To avert this precarious scenario, the government injected a total of ¥9.3 trillion 
(roughly $90 billion) into the countries’ leading banks. This was accompanied by fierce 
political debate, and thus resulted in stringent rules for banks on how to improve their 
businesses. Finding themselves in the spotlight, banks began to reorganize and clean up 
their nonperforming loans. True reorganization was made possible by a legal revision that 
allowed financial holding companies. By the early 2000s, Japan’s 15 leading banks had 
merged into four large financial groups (Mizuho, MUFG, Sumitomo-Mitsui, and Resona). 
Also in 1998, two long-term credit banks came under government receivership and were 
subsequently sold to U.S. equity funds that successfully turned them around into Shinsei 
and Aozora. Smaller banks were in a similarly perilous situation, and their restructuring 
triggered the “credit crunch” of the period 1998-2003, during which many small firms lost 
access to funding. All this exacerbated a severe recession, and since all other government 
attempts, including a “zero interest rate policy”, proved futile, moving forward with legal 
                                                 
3 Shifts in politics and vested interests were critically important in this process, but are better discussed in 
research on political change in Japan. See Pempel (1998) for prescient analysis of the precursors to this 
“regime shift”, Vogel (2006) for the interplay of government and business in this reform process, and Poe et 
al. (2002) for an early analysis of Commercial Code reforms from a political perspective. Amyx (2004) 
analysis the role of the Ministry of Finance and the political background of the 1990s financial crisis. 
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reform and fundamental restructuring became the only viable, and last, resort.  
 To avoid tedious legal discussion, we will simply group the legal reforms into 
four large categories here, and zoom in on their main effects. The first set of changes 
concerned regulation, transparency and oversight, which arguably began with the “Big 
Bang” financial reforms of 1998. These covered almost all financial areas, and had in 
common a big push towards stricter disclosure (in particular, a shift to accounting at 
current market values as opposed to historical book values, as well as consolidated 
balance sheets such that firms could no longer conceal losses in nicely cloaked 
subsidiaries).4 The shift to disclosure and transparency was paired with a new approach to 
financial regulation, as the previous reliance on informal means of process regulation 
through administrative guidance and behind-closed-doors workouts was replaced with 
by-the-book inspections and meaningful sanctions of violators. In particular, with the 
establishment of the Financial Services Agency in 1998, and the fast rise to true authority 
by that agency, even laggard banks had to face the reality of their non-performing loan 
quandary.  
 A second important change came with the introduction of new bankruptcy 
legislation. Throughout the postwar period, large firms in trouble had typically been 
forced into an informal workout in which the main bank would assume the lead role in 
arranging the refinancing of debt and a managerial turnaround. Bankruptcy laws dating 
back to 1927 and 1951 were too cumbersome for “Chapter 11” type reorganizations, so 
that companies had little choice but to allow their bank to take over. In 2000, a new “Civil 
Rehabilitation Law” introduced such reorganization (including for individuals), and 
                                                 
4 The shift towards mark-to-market valuation was introduced in 2000, and in 2001 cross-shareholdings (i.e. 
stable share ownership by banks and companies) shifted to mark-to-market rules as well.  
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together with the 2003 revision of the “Corporate Reorganization Law” introduced new 
processes for efficiently structured turnarounds. The courts of Tokyo and Osaka 
established special divisions to handle such procedures without delay. A further reform in 
this area was a 2001 guideline for “out-of-court workouts” that clarified the structure of 
bank-led turnarounds. Finally, the 2004 revision of the Liquidation Law established 
clear-cut rules for a shutdown of debtors and a fair distribution of assets. All this triggered 
a wave of shutdowns and reorganizations, and helped greatly in cleaning up the aftermath 
of bubble period excesses. 
 The third area of change was implemented through annual revisions of the 
Commercial Code, starting in 1997. At the end of this process, Japanese companies now 
have a variety of options for reorganization through mergers and acquisitions and 
spin-offs, as well as executive compensation. Many of the legal revisions concerned types 
of stock, and what companies were allowed to do with shares. For example, in 1998 stock 
buybacks were introduced, which invited a large-scale repurchase of equity issued during 
the bubble years 1987-1991. It became possible to swap stocks to accomplish a merger, 
and by allowing a variety of different types of stock, companies could give different rights 
to different types of owners (e.g., for a takeover defense). In short, stock market rules 
were reconfigured to allow for the exchange of ownership stakes, friendly or hostile.  
 A final set of revisions concerned corporate governance, as eventually spelled out 
in the Corporation Law of May 2006. The significance of this law can hardly be 
exaggerated. Not only does it pull away from the archaic and convoluted Commercial 
Code all rules pertaining to companies, thus clarifying and streamlining rules and 
regulations, as well as categories of companies and how they are governed. What is more, 
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the law turned the regulatory philosophy of corporate legislation on its head, by shifting 
from the (originally German) logic of “ex ante regulation” (i.e., everything that is not 
explicitly allowed is therefore prohibited) towards “post-remedy” rules (everything that is 
not specifically prohibited is therefore allowed, with courts ruling on problematic issues 
as they occur).5
 For corporate strategy, this meant greatly increased flexibility for managers in 
how to organize their companies, who to merge with, what business units to spin off, and 
how to earn profits. The Corporation Law is explicit about this increased flexibility, but 
also introduces new processes of oversight, by shifting significant monitoring powers to 
shareholders. Japanese annual shareholders’ meetings that in the past were known for 
record-breaking brevity (lest any trouble occur) and described as “shan shan” 
(“open-applause-close”) meetings, have been replaced by much more strictly regulated 
and governed processes (Fujita 2006, Diamond Weekly 2006).6
   
3. From Long-Term Ties to Dynamic Competition 
 
 The shift in legal logic means that the Japanese CEO of the 21st century faces 
significantly more freedom in strategic decision-making, but also greater pressures in 
terms of accountability, liability, and responsibility. An entrepreneurial company can now 
                                                 
5 Fujita (2006) describes the shift as one from “preemptive rules, with informal bureaucratic discretion in 
ambiguous areas” to “freedom in principle, with ongoing formal oversight”. This shift had formed the basis 
of Commercial Code revisions since 2000; see Ministry of Justice, “Japanese Corporate Law: Drastic 
Changes in 2000-2001 and the Future”, www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/jcld-01.html. 
6 Annual shareholders meetings in Japan used to be 20-minute gatherings by passive shareholders who 
would simply acquiesce in management-sponsored proposals without asking challenging questions. More 
activist shareholders often had difficulty attending because most companies would hold the meetings on the 
same day at the same time, and so-called sōkaiya (mafia-related shareholders paid to protect management) 
guarded the doors like bouncers at a hip nightclub. 
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position itself like no other, gaining competitive advantage from new ideas and new 
processes. All this occurred at a time of great political change through the centralization 
of power in the Cabinet Office under Prime Minister Koizumi, which greatly curtailed the 
discretion and influence of ministries. One important part of the legal revisions of 1998 
was the substitution of a new “Foreign Exchange Law” for the old “Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Control Law”. This law had been a great source of ministerial prowess 
in the postwar period, by affording ministries the power to withhold something (such as 
imports of raw materials or licenses for new technologies) that firms badly wanted, so that 
ministries could entice “good” corporate behavior. Trade controls had also provided 
protection from imports in many domestic markets.  
 The 1998 legal change removed the last vestiges of cross-border controls. 
Moreover, Japan’s financial markets had begun to turn global, and the leading Japanese 
firms themselves contributed to their exposure to global competition by increasingly 
outsourcing from abroad. Government-organized research consortia, to the extent they 
continued, had long shifted to basic research, meaning that competition had also arrived 
from innovation and new technologies. In short, the competitive setting for Japanese firms 
has completely changed. To be sure, a handful of protected industries remained, and some 
companies refused to acknowledge the new competitive environment. But as the changes 
in laws, regulations and markets were taking hold, an increasing number of companies in 
industry after industry began to reconsider their competitive positioning in this much 




The Main Bank 
 To compete successfully in the 21st century, companies face challenges that are 
very different from those of the protected, fast growing environment of the postwar period. 
A first development towards this new market environment was the diversification of 
finance that set in as early as in the mid-1980s (Hoshi/Kashyap 2001, Schaede 2000). 
Financial deregulation allowed firms to raise external funds more easily through the issue 
of stocks, bonds and short-term notes. As a result, the portion of bank lending directed at 
large firms began to shrink to a point where many no longer rely on bank loans for 
investment needs. Therefore, the financial leverage of Japanese firms, expressed as the 
ratio of debt (interest-bearing liabilities) to equity, has fallen from dramatic levels during 
the postwar period to a much more normalized situation. Figure 1 shows that from a peak 
of almost 600% (for large firms with capital exceeding ¥1 billion, and even higher on 
average) in the mid-1970s, the debt-equity ratio has fallen to less than 200% for large 
firms in the early 21st century. The chemical and electronics industries have been 
particularly aggressive at reducing bank loan reliance, with debt-equity ratios of around 
100% in the early 2000s. 
 A lower debt-equity ratio means reduced dependence on banks. Companies 
finance projects increasingly through retained earnings, or to the extent they require 
external funds, through issuing stocks or bonds. To do this, however, companies have to 
fully disclose information on their business, and profitability becomes a critically 
important factor in determining the cost of financing. Not coincidentally, in the early 21st 
century Japanese companies began to publish information on their ROE (return on equity) 
and other measures of profitability to attract investors.  
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 Given all the research hailing the virtues of the main bank system in terms of 
patient capital and insurance, why would banks and companies separate in this way? Four 
main reasons can be identified how this process happened, and why it demarcates an 
irreversible change in banking. First, financial deregulation has already been mentioned; 
the fact that companies so eagerly diversified their external financing portfolio bespeaks 
of the pressures that were inherent in the main bank system, as highly leveraged firms 
were constrained in their strategies by the main bank which was interested mostly in 
growing sales through high diversification. Not all companies found this monitoring 
situation enjoyable. 
It became even less palatable after the burst of the bubble, when banks, 
struggling with financial difficulties, began dropping the ball on their main clients. When 
in 1997 Fuji Bank announced that it was too financially stressed to rescue Yamaichi 
Securities, some companies confronted with serious financial challenges and more 
stringent disclosure rules themselves, began to sell off cross-held shares that were a drag 
on profits. 
 After the Financial Services Agency introduced a definition of a “non-performing 
loan” in 1998 and then pressured banks to close such loans in their portfolios, banks 
began to lean more heavily on clients to sell off non-profitable or strategically secondary 
assets, including real estate, golf courses, factories, business units, and even cross-held 
shares. At the same time, banks themselves underwent a similar process, and a 2001 law 
further pushed the process of banks’ selling off their ownership stakes in corporations (see 
below).  
 Perhaps most importantly, interest rate regulation as well as restrictions on 
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external funding, including abroad, had eventually been phased out. For companies, bank 
loans were no longer the cheapest or even easiest way to secure funding. For banks, less 
dependency on loans translated into much reduced influence over companies, but also less 
financial interest in monitoring and supporting companies. This divergence of interests 
was extended by a strategic shift in the banking industry, away from the previous reliance 
on lending (which used to be their bread and butter under regulated interest rates) and 
towards fee-based income (such as underwriting of securities issues or syndicated loans). 
Both, banks and companies had begun to move towards more flexible means of funding 
that allowed them to react better and faster to changing market situations.  
 A 1999 Cabinet Office survey on the merits of the main bank system supports 
these findings. Table 1 shows the three primary benefits of a main bank relation, both 
reflecting back on the past and estimating future needs, as listed by 1,361 listed 
companies (of which 806 in manufacturing). As for the past, the answers were 
predominantly about “stability”, “long-term relations”, and “service”. In looking forward, 
however, the “stability” type of responses dropped by half. In their stead, companies now 
valued creditworthiness due to the bank’s reputation, support in global business, and 
specialized advice on financial strategies, including how to structure mergers and 
acquisitions. This shift in demand has triggered restructuring within banks, including 
human resource practices (from generalists to specialists, and from seniority to 
meritocracy). Overall, the survey suggests that the main bank system per se is still valued, 
but the functions and the role of the main bank have begun to change. Rather than being a 
stable source of long-term support, the main bank is turning into a resource for knowledge, 
information, and execution of unbundling strategies. 
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 Keiretsu Membership 
 Throughout the postwar period, Japanese firms strove to shield themselves from 
the threats of competition – both in the form of corporate control and takeovers, as well as 
market share loss – through corporate tie-ups. These tie-ups came in three main forms: 
large, inter-market groups; vertical lineups of subcontractors and other suppliers; and 
vertical tie-ups with exclusive wholesalers and retailers in distribution. All three have 
undergone great transformations: the supplier relations have become more diversified, and 
the retail revolution that began in the late 1990s has all but undermined exclusive 
wholesaler arrangements (Schaede, forthcoming). The focus here is on the “Big 6” 
horizontal groups.  
 Excellent research on these groups paired with superb data, unavailable for most 
other countries, has afforded us great insights into the workings of these groups during the 
postwar period. From data based on Toyo Keizai’s annual Kigyō Keiretsu Sōran, we can 
measure cross-held ownership stakes, personnel dispatches, and within-group loans. 
Regular surveys by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (triggered by the economic 
dominance of these groups) from 1977 through 2001 have added qualitative information 
over time. Sociologists (Gerlach 1992, Lincoln/Gerlach 2004, Lincoln et al. 1996, 1998) 
have used these data for in-depth statistical network analyses, while economists have 
provided us with studies on the implications of these networks for corporate finance and 
industrial organization (e.g., Hoshi/Kashyap 2001, Hoshi 1994, Lawrence 1993, Nakatani 
1984, Caves/Uekusa 1976).  
 From this research four main insights have formed our knowledge of these 
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groups. First, there are two types of “horizontal groups” – three that are descendants of 
prewar zaibatsu reconstituted in the 1950s (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo), and three 
that were anchored by banks (Fuyō, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyō (DIK)).7 Each of these 
groups had several core firms (such as a large bank, a trading house, and perhaps a heavy 
machinery company), but no company was dominant in terms of ownership stake; rather, 
each group member owned, on average, 1-2% of the shares of other group members. The 
groups followed a fairly strict rule referred to as “one-setism”: one group would not 
include more than one competitor in each industry, to prevent intra-group competition 
(leading Caves/Uekusa (1976) to label these groups “inter-market”). With increasing 
diversification, this rule was loosened over time; for example, Mitsubishi Heavy and 
Mitsubishi Electric eventually began to compete in several product segments. Note that 
“one-setism” means that a business group was not a cartel in the economic sense of the 
word, because it did not dominate any one industry segment. It has been pointed out, 
however, that one effect of these arrangements were “repeated oligopolies” (Hadley 
1970): in product market after product market the top three or four leading firms would be 
from one of these groups. Overall, groups numbered between 20-40 members, so that 
roughly 200-220 of the largest Japanese firms of the postwar period were members of the 
Big 6 horizontal keiretsu. 
 The main purpose of these groups has been presented as “insurance”. In the 
1950s, companies attempted to shield themselves from foreign hostile takeovers. When 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, the group anchored by the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) has not been considered in this 
context, although it has been referred to as the “chō-eriito, jitsuryoku Number 1” (super-elite, most 
influential group, Ōsono 1991), and due to the Mizuho merger is now amalgamating with the DIK and Fuyō 
groups. Members of the IBJ group included Japan Airlines, Nissan Motors, Central Glass, Japan Steel, 
Dai-Shōwa Paper, Aoki Construction, Kuraray and Japan Railways West. See Calder (1993) on the role of 
IBJ as a signal setter of directions of industrial policy. 
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the government proved it could effectively implement foreign exchange controls (through 
1964, and in different shape after Japan joined the IMF and GATT), the emphasis of 
protection shifted to insurance against the domestic stock market, through an agreement 
that reciprocally held ownership stakes would not be sold, especially in times of crisis, 
and that dividends would be kept low (a custom developed to cap them at 10% of a 
stock’s face value, which was either ¥50 or ¥500).8 Thus, for group firms the foregone 
return on investment in shares represented an insurance premium against their own 
stock’s price volatility.  
 Various studies have shown that group firms had lower average profitability than 
non-group firms, but also lower variance in profitability over time (e.g., Nakatani 1984, 
Hoshi/Kashyap 2001). Thus, group membership came at a cost, and the foregone profits 
were an insurance premium against market uncertainty. The finding of lower profits can 
be explained by the more conservative attitude of companies that joined and remained in 
groups. Over time, it is also possible that group firms were increasingly “old industry” 
firms (such as cement, steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, etc.) which after a growth spurt lost 
out in Japan’s changing industrial structure after the oil crisis of the 1970s (Suzuki 2005). 
Another important contributor to lower profits were the preferential trade agreements 
among group firms: one underlying facet of group membership was that all firms would 
buy at least a certain portion of their input materials from other group firms, in particular 
in times of crisis (Schaede, forthcoming). While this was most relevant in intermediate 
                                                 
8 The majority of stocks in the early postwar period had a par value of ¥50, so that most companies paid 
dividends of ¥5 per share. Hodder/Tschoegl (1985) calculate for the period 1960-1983 that the 1,500 largest 
firms listed on the 1st Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange paid an average of between 5.92 and 6.88 yen 
per share; during that same period, the TSE index increased sevenfold, so that average dividend yields 
declined to roughly 1% of the share price during that quarter of a century. Even under regulated interest 
rates more profitable venues of investment could have easily been identified. 
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products and equipment (e.g., steel, chemicals, turbines, or machine tools), it was visible 
even to the naked eye: at a Mitsubishi plant, only drinks from Kirin (a group member) 
would be served. When Mazda fell into crisis in the 1970s, in addition to providing 
financial support and absorb some surplus labor, Sumitomo group firms kindly requested 
that all employees purchase a new Mazda car (Pascale/Rohlen 1983). Preferential trade 
overrode cost considerations, and only a most blatantly inefficient group member may 
have been subjected to a “modernization” campaign by fellow group firms. The important 
gain for a member firm from preferential trade was to establish a minimum quarterly sales 
volume that served as a buffer against sales variations over the business cycle. As we have 
already seen, during the go-go years of high investment and high leverage in the 1960s 
and 1970s, maintaining revenues was critical to please the bank. As profitability was 
secondary in those years, the tradeoff between higher profits and group insurance was 
easy to make. 
 Taken together, these various elements bespeak of the main raison d’etre of 
horizontal groups during the postwar period: protection, long-term stability, and reduced 
uncertainty in a fast-changing market. However, a number of indicators suggest that much 
of this has come to change. Table 2 summarizes the most critical measures of Big 6 
impact and cohesion. From the upper part of the table, we realize that the economic role 
of the horizontal groups has declined significantly between 1970 and the turn of the 
century: whereas the Big 6 accounted for almost one fifth of total capital and assets, and 
15% of total sales in Japan’s economy in the 1970s, these ratios have fallen to the low 
10% range. Again, some of this decrease may be attributable to many core group firms 
operating in “old” (i.e. structurally depressed) industries. Regardless, so clear is the 
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evidence that horizontal groups no longer dominate Japan’s economy that in 2001 the 
JFTC has terminated its economic impact survey of the Big 6 groups.  
 The lower part of Table 2 compares four measures of group cohesiveness 
between 1981 and 1999. The first measure is the percentage of total group firms’ shares 
outstanding that is owned by other group firms. On average, this ratio has fallen from 
25% to 20%, although the three “old zaibatsu” groups have always recorded a higher 
shareholding ratio than the “new bank” groups. As of 1999, in no group did the group 
shareholdings represent the majority owner (33%) any more. 
 A similar downward trend is also observable for preferential trade. On average, 
in 1999 group firms purchased but 6.4% of all inputs or goods from other group firms. 
This decline of 50% reflected a growing concern with costs at a time of market opening 
and globalization. The dispatch of senior executives to other group firms’ board of 
directors has also halved from 8.6% of group directors sitting on other group boards, to 
4.2%. In this category, even the “old zaibatsu” groups do not stand out. Finally, 
intra-group lending refers to the percentage of loan volume in group main banks that is 
furnished to own group firms. It has always been the case that while the main bank was 
the largest lender to group firms, it was rarely the only one; instead it functioned as a 
delegated monitor for loans from other large banks (Sheard 1989, 1994). Moreover, we 
have already seen that main banks are no longer as actively engaged in lending, as 
opposed to other financial services, and beginning in the mid-1980s even the large (city) 
banks furnished most of their loan to medium- and small-sized firms. Table 2 suggests 
that the level of main bank dependence by group firms has dropped to an almost 
negligible level.  
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Figure 2 maps the two main categories of intra-group ownership and preferential 
trade from Table 2 into a two-axis repositioning chart. The longest distance, reflecting the 
biggest loss in cohesion, was covered by Sumitomo, and the smallest by Dai-Ichi Kangyō. 
The “old zaibatsu” Mitsui group is no longer more cohesive than the “bank group” DIK, 
but Fuyō and Sanwa take the lowest spots. The Mitsubishi group, always the tightest and 
most conservative of all, remains in that situation, and the decline is more in terms of 
purchasing than it is in shareholding. Overall, the cohesiveness of all groups has waned 
considerably. 
 Table 3 is similar to Table 1 in that it reports survey data on the perceived costs 
and benefits of cross-shareholdings for the past and the future. Note a fourfold increase in 
the number of responses that see no merit in cross-shareholdings. At the same time, 
reported costs include potential economic loss, lack of outside monitoring due to keiretsu 
dominance, and the fetters of preferential trade. Just as in Table 2, whereas stable, 
protected, long-term relations were valued in the past, the inefficiencies associated with 
these tie-ups are now often considered too severe, and the tie-ups too restrictive, for 
companies to compete successfully in the 21st century. 
 With the changing market and legal environment the value of keiretsu networks 
in their old form has weakened. This does not mean that keiretsu are necessarily going to 
disappear (although the bank mergers, such as that of Sumitomo and Mitsui, may lead to 
the merging of groups). Rather, to survive and remain meaningful, these groups have to 
rework their value proposition. Stability, longevity, and reciprocity are all beneficial for 
high-leverage, high sales strategies, but in the new 21st century pursuit (and disclosure) of 
profitability these virtues apparently are losing their appeal and usefulness. 
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 Cross-Shareholdings and the New Shareholder Structure 
 Cross-shareholdings were the glue that held business groups together, thus 
providing the various aspects of insurance through group membership. Recall that these 
table shareholdings were based on an understanding that they would not be sold, in 
particular in times of crisis or market downturn, to cushion the effects of stock market 
fluctuations on management decision-making. Perhaps like no other aspect of change 
involving keiretsu, the steep decline in cross-shareholdings and the new composition of 
Japan’s overall shareholder structure have brought great forces for change in the country’s 
corporate governance.   
 For the years 1987 through 2003, we have detailed data on cross-shareholdings 
from two annual surveys that collate data from corporate Annual Reports with survey 
responses on large shareholders: the Nihon Life Institute’s annual survey (NLI 2004) and 
the Daiwa Research Institute survey (DRI 2004). NLI also takes credit for introducing a 
strict distinction between “stable shareholders” (antei kabunishi, stock ownership that 
may be unilateral but is long-term, aimed at buttressing a trade relationship or for other 
political reasons) and “mutual shareholders” (mochiai kabunishi, reciprocal commitments, 
even if unbalanced, to cement even tighter corporate relations). Thus, reciprocal 
shareholdings constituted the superglue of group cohesion.  
Figure 3 presents the percentage of stable shareholders and mochiai of total stocks 
outstanding. The top line shows that whereas stable shareholdings remained fairly 
unchanged at over 45% of all shares until 1995, this ratio has dropped by half, to a level 
of under 25% in 2003. The upright bars in Figure 3 illustrate that the percentage of firms 
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that identified themselves has having at least one stable stock in their portfolio dropped 
from its previous level of over 95% up to 1996 to 83% in 2003.  
The decline is even more remarkable for the superglue – the restrictive reciprocal 
(mochiai) shareholdings. The second line in Figure 3 shows that whereas in the 1980s and 
early 1990s more than 17% of listed firms were intertwined in mutual ownership, this 
ratio fell to 7.6% in 2003. Expressed in absolute terms for the year 2002, of a total market 
valuation of ¥237 trillion for all 2,674 listed firms, ¥17.6 trillion was identified by survey 
respondents as being “mutual”. This not only represented a decline of ¥10 trillion over a 
one-year period, but the downward trend continues. The year 2003 was the 17th year in a 
row in which the percentage of mochiai declined. In April 2005, NLI, the research 
institute that introduced the differentiation between stable and reciprocal shareholdings, 
announced that it would discontinue its survey, for the phenomenon had become too small 
to measure accurately (NLI web site, April 7, 2005; Kuroki 2003, NLI 2004, Suzuki 
2005). 
 
Banks Selling Out 
 Data breaking down reciprocal shareholdings by industry show that the largest 
contributors to this unraveling were the large commercial (or city and long-term credit) 
banks. Whereas these 16 top banks held about 11% of total stock market capitalization in 
1991, their holdings reduced to just 3.6% in 2003 (DRI 2004: 6). If we include in the 
group of “large banks” the 47 regional banks, as of March 2006 these banks owned 4.7% 
of total shares at the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The sell-off began with the onset of bank 
failures in the mid-1990s. Adding to this were the bank mergers, planning for which 
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began with the Financial Big Bang in 1998. Moreover, increased disclosure and pressures 
on profits, paired with loosening business group ties, shifted the economic balance of 
cross-shareholdings towards selling out.  
 Although some banks had idiosyncratic or temporary reasons to sell shares from 
their portfolio, the trend is industry-wide and unlikely to be reversed, because the most 
important trigger of the mass sell-off after 2001 was the new Law Limiting the Bank’s 
Stock Ownership (Ginkō-tō no kabushiki-tō no hoyū no seigen-tō ni kan suru hōritsu; 
hereafter “Ownership Limit Law”). Designed to limit the banks’ exposure to risky assets 
and thus improve the stability of the banking system, this law limits the total amount of 
corporate equity that one bank can own to its own Tier 1 capital.9 In other words, the 
Ownership Limit Law reduced the scope of bank shareholdings to the bank’s size, strictly 
defined as capital. In Fiscal Year 2001, the largest four banks alone were estimated to face 
an “overhang” of about ¥7 trillion that had to be sold off. Remarkably, the banks did 
much more than required: whereas in March 2001, commercial banks (excluding trust 
banks) held ¥35.7 trillion of shares at current market value, their holdings shrunk to ¥26.9 
trillion in March 2002 and ¥18.2 trillion in March 2003. During this time, the stock 
market moved largely sideways, with the Nikkei Index closing at 10,542 in 2001, and 
10,676 in 2004. In other words, in Yen terms banks halved the value of their 
stockholdings within a two-year period, not due to stock price levels but to sell-offs (TSE 
2006b: 66, 79). The decline in the role of banks as shareholders was due to the 2001 
                                                 
9 “Tier 1 capital” is terminology from the Basel Accord, which requires a capital adequacy ratio for 
internationally operating banks of at least 8%. In the Basel Accord calculation, there are two types (tiers) of 
capital, of which the Tier 1 refers to the bank’s paid-in capital, shareholder’s equity, and retained earnings 
not yet appropriated at the end of the fiscal year. Tier 2 capital, in contrast, consists of the bank’s stock 
portfolio, plus loan loss reserves and subordinated debt issued by the bank. The new law says that Tier 2 
capital (ownership in other firms) must not exceed Tier 1 (the bank’s own equity).  
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Ownership Limit Law, and therefore not easily reversible.   
 Reducing banks’ shareholdings to Tier 1 capital was a process that lasted through 
April 2006. To facilitate this self-off and cushion its effects on the stock market, two 
“overflow repository” (“ukezara”) mechanisms were put into place. The first was the 
establishment, in January 2002, of the “Banks’ Shareholdings Purchase Corporation” 
(Ginkō-tō hoyū kabushiki shutoku kikō). This government-backed entity was created by its 
members (large commercial banks, Norin Chukin and Shinkin Chukin) for a limited 
lifespan of 10 years. Equipped with funds of ¥2 trillion and the ability to issue 
government-backed bonds, the company was tasked with buying shares from its members, 
and for a fee selling these to the market in due course. In addition, when banks still found 
it difficult to find buyers, between November 2002 and September 2004 the Bank of 
Japan (the central bank) stepped in and within a few months absorbed another ¥1.7 trillion 
worth of banks’ shares (Nikkei May 11, 2006; Kuroki 2003:6).10
 
The New Shareholders: Institutional Investors 
The unraveling of stable cross-shareholdings has affected the shareholder structure 
for Japanese firms. At the height of the postwar system, in 1987, corporations and large 
banks together owned 71% of shares traded (or held stable) at the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Who, then, bought all these shares? Figure 4 reveals that the unraveling has given rise to 
                                                 
10 In addition, the Deposit Insurance Corporation had assumed vast shareholdings from the two failing 
long-term credit banks in 1998 (now Shinsei and Aozora). By May 2006, it was estimated that the Bank of 
Japan had earned paper gains of ¥1.8 trillion on its investment, and the purchase corporation another ¥1 
trillion, making up for some of the losses of the banking system in the previous years (Nikkei May 22, 
2006). Note that the purchases by the Bank of Japan and the Banks’ Shareholding Purchase Corporation 
have not affected the share of government ownership at the TSE, because these are considered “corporate 
investors” (the Bank of Japan is 50% in private ownership). Therefore, the “corporate” share in Figure 4 
below would be even smaller without those “repository” holdings, or said differently, will not increase 
markedly even if all those bank shares were to be sold back to corporations. 
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two new dominant groups of shareholders in Japan: Japanese institutional investors (in the 
form of trusts) and foreigners.  
 One important mechanism of stock absorption was for companies to buy back 
their own shares. This became possible with a 1998 amendment of the Commercial Code, 
and successively easier with subsequent revisions of that law. By June 2002, 822 listed 
firms had repurchased ¥3.1 trillion of their own shares. Analysts believe that a large 
portion of these buy-backs were shares previously held by banks in reciprocal 
arrangements (Kuroki 2003:6). This implies that the previous reciprocal owners were not 
all replaced by other stable owners, but rather that a part of the former bank-corporate 
mochiai holdings have been completely dissolved. Nevertheless, the share of corporations 
in total stock ownership in Japan dropped from over 30% in 1986 to 22% in 2004. 
 Figure 4 illustrates the remarkable increase in the role of foreign investors at the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange: in March 2006, they represented the largest groups of investors at 
the TSE with 27% (in comparison, the share of foreign investors at the New York Stock 
Exchange was roughly 7% at the time). Industries in which foreign investors held more 
than 30% in 2004 included transportation equipment, electronics, insurance, 
pharmaceuticals and precision machinery, while financial services, chemicals, real estate 
and petroleum were also above 24% (TSE 2006a: 8).  
 While some of these purchases were due to tie-ups among companies (such as 
Nissan and Renault, or Ford and Mazda), foreign investors also increased their ownership 
stakes through so-called “street name” trusts, such as Chase Manhattan Bank, London, or 
State Street Bank & Trust Co.. Japan had become an investment opportunity for investors 
who were betting on an imminent recovery of the stock market or a long-term devaluation 
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of the US-Dollar. Another significant source of investment was acquisitions of Japanese 
firms by foreign investment funds, in particular real estate, private equity and 
management buyout funds. As mentioned, when banks forced accelerated non-performing 
loan cleanup beginning in 1998, they increased pressure on their clients to spin-off 
business units that were either not profitable or not central to the core business. Many of 
these spin-offs were acquired by foreign turnaround funds. Finally, in the early 2000s 
Japan’s market for mergers and acquisitions began to heat up. About one third of mergers 
and acquisitions in that period were “out-in” deals, meaning foreign investments into 
Japan (Schaede 2006).  
 However, it is important to note that not all “foreign” investments was 
necessarily from foreign money, as there was reason to believe that many of the foreign 
investment funds had attracted Japanese money (Diamond Weekly 2005). Japanese banks 
in particular would have been interested in such indirect investment in Japan for two 
reasons. They were cash-rich during a period of zero interest loans in which they curbed 
their lending due to BIS constraints and the nonperforming loan crisis. Yet, they did not 
want to appear unpatriotic “vultures” by buying up assets underlying their competitors’ or 
their own bad loans. Therefore, in addition to launching their own buyout funds, Japanese 
financial institutions invested in foreign funds. Regardless who was behind the money, 
however, and even if foreign shareholdings were to decline somewhat with fewer 
investment opportunities, foreign investors had arrived, ready to challenge the processes 
of corporate governance in Japan. 
 The second group of new shareholders is Japanese institutional investors in the 
form of trust banks. Figure 4 shows although financial institutions as a group (large 
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commercial banks, trust banks, insurance companies, and others) reduced their holdings, 
the shrinkage in bank and insurance company holdings was counterbalanced by a 
substantial increase in the role of trust banks, from less than 10% in the 1980s, to 18.4% 
in 2006. Trust banks have always enjoyed special status within Japan’s banking system, as 
they were commercial banks (collecting deposits) allowed to offer pooled securities 
investing (such as mutual funds). The seven trust banks of the postwar period suffered 
badly after the bubble period, but in the early 2000s they became parts of the newly 
emerging financial holdings, to play an increasingly important role in the 21st century.  
 The increase in trust investments triggered the meteoric rise of “re-funds” (funds 
of funds) to the position of main shareholder for many firms. In 2000, the Japan Trustee 
Services Bank, Ltd. (Nihon turasuto saabisu shintaku ginkō) was founded, with 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking, Resona Bank, and Mitsui Trust Holding each owning one 
third. In a process referred to as sai-shintaku (“re-trust”, apparently meant to be similar to 
re-insurance), this bank manages the investment trust businesses of two of main financial 
groups. It claims to employ highly specialized human and technological capital when 
investing both assets and retirement benefits entrusted of their owners and their clients. 
With ¥144 trillion (roughly $1.3 trillion) in assets under management, Japan Trustee 
Services serves as a major shareholder for many major listed firms. 
 Similarly, the Nippon Master Trust (Nihon masutaa turasuto shintaku ginkō) was 
established in 2002 as the specialized trust investor of the Mitsubishi UFJ group. In 
addition to Mitsubishi UFJ Trust&Banking, Nippon Life Insurance, and Meiji Yasuda Life 
Insurance, this bank also counted Nōchū Trust, the trust arm of the umbrella bank for all 
agricultural cooperatives, as a shareholder. With ¥106 trillion (almost $1 trillion) to invest, 
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this bank became the second seemingly ubiquitous shareholder in the early 2000s.11
 Table 4 presents the largest ten shareholders for a sample of large Japanese firms,  
by category of investor. For this impressionistic demonstration, firms were selected 
simply by keiretsu affiliation (there is one for each of the Big 6, as well as two 
independents) and by virtue of being in different industries; Canon and Orix are included 
because they are often hailed as two opposing models of corporate governance. A reader 
skeptical of the selection is invited to pick any number of other firms and see for herself: 
In 2006, finding a large Japanese company where neither Japanese Trustee Services nor 
Nippon Master Trust was among the top 10 shareholders was the difficult task. In Table 4, 
institutional investors were the largest group of investors at each of the firms presented. 
This is true both for the most traditional of companies in the old zaibatsu groups, as well 
as for non-affiliated firms. The face of Japanese stockownership has clearly begun to 
change. 
 The super-trusts act as custodians, as they specialize in securities processing, i.e., 
the administration of funds sold by investment banks (mutual funds), pension funds, or 
investment trusts. The large trusts vote on proxy as asked by the retail fund managers. 
Unlike the main owners of the postwar period (corporations and banks) these fund 
managers are in competition with each other for returns on investment, and therefore are 
unlikely to exhibit the same long-term, patient approach. Rather, fund managers aim for 
high-profit companies and invest in industry leaders. While those who doubt true change 
                                                 
11 Moreover, in January 2001 the Mizuho Financial Group established Trust&Custody Services Bank, Ltd. 
(Shisan kanri saabisu shintaku ginkō). Owned by Mizuho (54%) and four life insurance companies that 
become part of that financial group after the merger of the three original banks (Dai-Ichi, Asahi, Meiji 
Yasuda, and Fukuoka Mutual Life), as of 2006 this company was investing assets of ¥94 trillion (roughly 
$900 billion). See the trusts’ website for more information: www.japantrustee.co.jp, www.mastertrust.co.jp, 
and www.tcsb.co.jp. 
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in Japan may augur that trust investments may simply replicate “stable” owners, it can be 
expected that the more assets these trusts manage and the more diversified their clientele 
becomes, the more concerned about returns will they become. It is inconceivable that a 
trust fund investing retirement benefits for hundreds of Japanese firms will not, eventually, 
be under pressure to earn above-average returns. Moreover, even if their subscribers are 
dominantly conservative, the trust banks have already changed the rules and processes of 
corporate governance, as they push to see profits. Market share expansion, high 
diversification, long-term technological bets and other strategies so valued by the highly 
exposed banks of the postwar era are no longer satisfying to these new dominant 
shareholders.   
 




So far, we have seen evidence suggesting a reorientation in corporate relationships in 
Japan. The main bank is assuming a new role, as it is no longer the largest lender or the 
largest financial shareholder for most companies. Keiretsu are being repositioned – with 
the possible exception of the Mitsubishi group – to provide not so much stability and 
long-term reciprocal trade, but rather information, know-how, and brand image. Business 
groups are beginning to provide benefits that help companies to compete more 
aggressively.  
 One major purpose behind the erstwhile stable arrangements was protection from 
the influence of out-of-group shareholders, be those frequent traders causing price 
fluctuations or hostile corporate raiders. Moreover, bankruptcy legislation was 
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cumbersome, making a rescue by the main bank, however disliked, the most efficient 
means of reorganization. Stock market rules were rigid, with no flexibility in the use of 
shares (for stock options, repurchases, or otherwise; even the nominal face value and 
trading unit was described by law). Corporate managers had little freedom in thinking up 
new and clever strategies, for rules and regulation had squeezed them into managerial 
straightjackets. At the same time, they faced little oversight: the board of directors 
consisted of inside executives, resulting in an overlap of management and monitoring. A 
1950 revision of the Commercial Code had even granted the Board of Directors the power 
to change the company’s by-laws without shareholder vote (Wakasugi 2006). The main 
bank, the “delegated monitor” for other borrowers, would observe the client but take 
action only when things got very bad. Thus, managers were confined by rules but not 
monitored in their routine managerial decision-making.  
 The multiple and fundamental revisions of business laws have changed all this. A 
revision of the Commercial Code afforded companies a choice to alter their board 
structure by adding outside directors and adopting a “committee system” of audit, 
nomination and compensation committees, with the majority of members being outside 
directors (defined as never having been directly affiliated with the company or its 
subsidiaries). This system was even stricter than in the U.S. where a company may have 
one or all of such committees; in Japan, a company adopting the “committee system” has 
to introduce all three. Together with the simultaneous introduction of different types of 
shares, stock options, and increased possibilities for corporate reorganization through 
mergers and acquisitions, these changes opened the door to new processes of governance 
(Hashimoto 2002, Ahmadjian 2003).  
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 Although celebrated at the time as a major breakthrough, only 5% of large firms 
adopted this “committee system” within the first three years. Even for those few firms, the 
committee system did little to change the role of shareholders in monitoring management. 
Moreover, critics voiced doubts as to whether the nominating committee would be 
co-opted by the company leadership, i.e. chosen to reflect executive interests (Itami 
2005).12 For 95% of firms, the 2002 reforms changed little.  
 As discussed above, the 2006 Corporation Law revised the legal logic, and on 
this no company was offered a choice: while CEOs are afforded greater freedom and new 
flexibility, they also face more stringent outside monitoring processes and clearer 
liabilities through a vastly empowered shareholders’ meeting. For example, while 
companies enjoy unprecedented liberties in revising their bylaws, any such change 
requires a 2/3 majority vote at the annual shareholders’ meeting (this is stricter than in the 
U.S., where a simple majority suffices). Other areas where approval at the shareholders’ 
meeting is now required include: (1) approval of balance sheet and budget; (2) dividends 
(shareholders decide when and to what extent these are to be paid); (3) executive 
compensation and stock options; (4) mergers and acquisition, both as raider and as target; 
(5) appointment of directors; (6) defense mechanisms against hostile takeovers; and (7) 
change of bylaws. Although this may look fairly standard, except for (5) all these could 
previously be decided upon by the board of directors; i.e. management itself.  
 Thus, the previous internal approach to corporate governance, based on 
consensus in an overlapping board and management leadership, has been replaced by 
                                                 
12 This has been shown to hold for the United States as well: in about 80% of Fortune 500 companies in the 
1990s, the CEO was also the Chairman of the board and in that role assembled nominating and 
compensation committees, which often existed of individuals interested in supporting current executives 
(Belliveau et al 1996).  
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much clearer processes established through laws and courts. Management is further 
observed by the FSA which has strengthened its stance as a watchdog, as became evident 
during the Livedoor scandal of 2005 and the subsequent criminal prosecution of related 
instances of insider trading (such as of the managers of the Murakami fund in June 2006). 
In addition to regulatory supervision, Fujita (2006) identifies four mechanisms through 
which the 2006 Corporation Law can be expected to make a real difference. The first is 
the rise of institutional investors that can be expected to utilize their new powers as 
shareholders, and thus fill the oversight vacuum created by the changing role of the main 
bank. This, together with new rules on disclosure, internet-based dissemination of 
corporate information to shareholders, and new voting rights for owners, is expected to 
fuel shareholder activism. Third, building on the multiple revisions of the Commercial 
Code since 1998, the new Corporation Law allows the creation of a viable market for 
corporate control. Whereas in 1995 Japan witnessed just one hostile takeover, in 2005 a 
total of 53 successful hostile takeovers were recorded (Schaede 2006). Finally, the 2006 
law is also expected to contribute to better corporate governance by greatly curbing the 
influence of sōkaiya – mafia-related attendants at shareholder meetings that influenced 
the agenda, for appropriate pay, such that no unkind questions could be raised. Electronic 
voting and a larger range of means to influence management for all shareholders may 
combine to undermine the sōkaiya’s control over information and ability to shape 
discussion and coerce votes.  
 All this combines to a fundamental change the logic of corporate governance in 
Japan that is best described as a shift away from the previous “contingent monitoring” by 
banks to a new “continuous monitoring” by a variety of actors ranging from investors and 
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regulators to securities analysts and rating agencies. In the “contingent” system of the 
postwar period, the main bank, relying on inside information gathered through years of 
repeated financial interactions with a company, would extend loans and provide financial 
services. In the event of impending collapse, it would substitute for the market for 
corporate control (Sheard 1989). While the main bank might have dispatched an 
employee to a struggling company to gather more information, it would step into true 
action only after a client had fallen into negative net worth and needed a debt 
restructuring. In that case, a turnaround team replaced incumbent managers, and 
refinancing schemes were worked out with other lenders. All this was done informally, 
with the goal of ensuring the company’s long-term survival, regardless of its economic 
viability. The economic costs associated with this system of governance contingent on 
bankruptcy was that a company could operate below its potential for many years before 
action was taken, creating economic efficiency losses. These losses did not just occur at 
the level of the underperforming but for the economy overall, as resource (labor, capital) 
were tied up in suboptimal usage. 
 In contrast, in “continuous” governance, monitoring occurs through constant, 
proactive, sampling by many different actors that are constantly checking up on the firm. 
These monitoring agents include institutional investors (domestic and foreign) as well as 
the market for corporate control (hostile takeovers). The previous stronghold over 
corporate information by the main bank has been replaced with quarterly earning 
statements, stricter accounting and disclosure rules, and a growing industry of information 
intermediaries, such as rating agencies and securities analysts. The incentive structure of 
these agents is radically different from that of banks as monitors, for they will be 
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activated at the first indication of sub-potential performance. They may simply sell 
underperforming stocks (thus inviting takeovers), practice “voice” by replacing the 
company’s leadership, or push management towards reforms. The biggest costs of this 
“continuous” system are legal, consulting and time expenses incurred in defending against 
a hostile takeover bid, and the economic waste created when securities analysts get it 
wrong, or when corporate raiders tear apart a healthy firm suffering from a temporary 
stock price slump. The biggest gain is that underperformance is made public at a very 
early stage, allowing management and owners alike to take action before the company 
falls into negative net worth.  
 In the early 21st century Japan’s system began to move away from its almost 
exclusive reliance on contingent governance to continuous monitoring. This is evidenced 
not only by the reduced role of banks, but also the decline, by half, of intra-group 
dispatches of senior executives to other group firms’ boards (Table 2). The 2006 
Corporation Law subjects even those companies that choose not to switch to a committee 
system with outside directors to face scrutiny by shareholders. Over time, more and more 
companies will realize that pressures towards higher profitability may be better answered 
by exposing management to a market of corporate information and early intervention.  
 
5. Conclusions: The Business Perspective 
 
 The 1990s have sometimes been described as “Japan’s lost decade” – a period of 
recession and crisis. However, as we look back on this decade, we realize that it 
constitutes a “strategic inflection point” for Japan, in that the changes, reforms, and 
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reorientation of rules, regulations, and the markets have resulted in a fundamentally and 
irreversibly different system. In this new context, Japanese companies have begun to 
adjust their corporate strategies to compete in the new, open, and much more dynamic 
markets. 
 During the postwar period, corporate strategies were directed at stability, 
longevity, and growing sales revenues to balance aggressive investments. The latter was 
accomplished through diversification, i.e., expansion into additional product markets. In 
the growth environment of Japan’s go-go years, the biggest threat to a corporation was not 
new competition (since industrial policies proved fairly effective in keeping new entry at 
bay). Rather, it was high exposure to risk of failure, due to high leverage. To hedge 
against this risk, many companies sought to buy “protection” by way of stable 
relationships with their banks, their trading partners, and their owners. This they found 
most conveniently in large business groups, the keiretsu, where the membership dues 
were foregone profits on investments (low dividends on stock holdings) and lower 
profitability, partially caused by preferential trades. The main bank, besides owning up to 
5% of a customer firm, provided easy access to funds for ever more investments in 
production capacity, but it reserved the right to interfere with management in exchange 
for its increasingly risky exposure. Banks were interested in receiving interest payments 
as scheduled, which pushed the highly leveraged and diversified firms to pursue revenue 
growth above all. Profits were not a main concern, so that the costs of keiretsu 
membership were clearly trumped by the benefits of higher certainty of survival, and thus 
ability to continue highly leveraged operations. 
 However, the 1990s challenged this logic along several dimensions. First, 
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industrial policy had run its course in terms of “strategic” growth sectors, for 
technological catch-up had been accomplished. Protection was phased out and markets 
opened up. Second, the banking crisis of 1998 had proven previous processes of informal 
regulation inadequate to maintain the banking sector’s health and reputation. Even before 
the crisis, financial regulation had turned the banks’ business model on its head: whereas 
previously, under fixed interest rates and rapid growth, every loan was a good loan given 
the guaranteed spread, interest rates now had to be adjusted for risk, which had to be 
evaluated not on the existence of real estate collateral but the viability of a business 
project. When the banks eventually emerged from the nonperforming loan dilemma, they 
did so with a new business model oriented more strongly towards fee income: the more 
transactions and clients, the higher this income. Rather than providing business mostly to 
group firms, banks sought for larger circles of customers. From the banks’ perspective, 
then, being just a main bank was insufficient to compete. Moreover, fewer large firms 
were highly dependent on bank loans, which lowered the incentives of banks to be 
watchful monitors. When a new law intended to increase the banking sector’s stability 
required the unwinding of banks’ shareholdings, they happily and eagerly began to sell off 
cross-held shares.  
 In the new environment, what is the value of an inter-market group, a main bank, 
or cross-shareholdings? For risk-averse firm (such as some Mitsubishi group members), 
in a more dynamic setting the appeal of insurance needs may rank even higher than before, 
which may lead to a smaller, more protective group, perhaps even with a more 
hierarchical organization and chain of command (not unlike the former zaibatsu). For 
aggressively competitive firms, in contrast, stability through insurance has turned into an 
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undesirable drag on profits. The fetters of group membership and preferential trades have 
proven too costly in a new setting of higher transparency and much stricter disclosure 
rules, where low profitability is immediately apparent. For these firms, value in group 
membership will result from benefits that make members more competitive and profitable 
than non-members. Information sharing, brand name recognition, and advanced financial 
support have been among the main responses to a 2001 questionnaire (JFTC 2001). One 
can think of pooled labor (to reduce the high fixed cost component in employment), 
exchange of specialized knowledge in new technologies, or joint subsidiaries as new 
patterns to be developed in the near future. Whatever it is, for most Japanese firms, the 
real value proposition of keiretsu and main banks will be not about safety, stability and 
insurance, but about forward progress and the ability to compete in dynamic and 
fast-changing global markets.  
 The stock market, meanwhile, reflects these ongoing changes, with new 
institutional investors taking over where cross-shareholdings have begun to untangle. 
Investment trusts are evaluated based on the return on investment, and they often trade 
actively to earn high returns, thereby causing variance in stock price to variance and 
perhaps even inviting hostile takeovers. Management will fare better heeding the concerns 
of these new shareholders. 
 These changes make companies and banks more interested in new governance 
processes, and the new Corporation Law of 2006 reflects this interest. In the new dynamic 
markets of the 21st century, Japan’s old system of behind-closed-doors deals and 
“open-applause-close” shareholder meetings are no longer the most efficient way to run a 
successful corporation. Of course, some old-style companies in old-style industries may 
 37
continue previous practices, but their fate is preordained: either they are irrelevant and 
their practices inconsequential, or they are viable and subject to acquisition in due course. 
Either way, knowingly or unwittingly, the dinosaurs that resist Japan’s new market 
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 Figure 1:  The Debt-Equity Ratio of Japanese Firms, 1960-2004 












'60 '62 '64 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04
All Industries All Manufacturers
Steel Machinery and Appliances 












Figure 2:  Changing Keiretsu Cohesion: The Combined Effect of Declining  
  Cross-Shareholdings and Preferential Trade in the Big Six Keiretsu 















































Figure 3:  Stable Shareholdings and Reciprocal Shareholdings, 1987-2003        














































Figure 4:  Ownership Percentages, by Type of Investor 
 Source: TSE (2006a), in % of total market capitalization, as of March each year 
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Table 1:  Survey on Benefits from the Main Bank System 
   In bold: response with the deepest drops or increases  
   (Total n=1,361 listed companies, up to 3 answers allowed; Source: CAO 1999) 
 





Having stable access to funds 59.7 50.3
Having main bank as a stable shareholder 49.5 27.6
Existence of a long-term trade relationship 32.4 16.4
Financing at conditions and interest rates that meet the firm's needs 28.6 35.1
High level of service in settlements and other transactions 24.9 23.4
High level if information and help on financial management 20.2 30.7
Rescue and support in times of crisis 18.0 17.4
Higher credit rating and financial health due to bank's reputation 9.8 20.6
Information and support in corporate strategies, such as M&A 5.2 18.0
High level of support in international business needs 5.2 11.2
Support through dispatch of executives 3.3 1.6
High level of management monitoring on fiscal and risk management matters 2.8 5.6









Table 2:  Summary of Changing Keiretsu Role and Cohesion 
  Source: collated from TK (various years) and JFTC (2001) 
 
Aspect of Keiretsu  Role
1) Overall Role in the Economy 1970 1998
% of Total Capital 18.9 13.2
% of Total Assets 17.5 11.2
% of Total Sales 15.0 10.8
2) Measures of Group Cohesion 1981 1999 1981 1999 1981 1999
Intra-Group Shareholding Ratio 25.5 20.1 32.2 25.0 19.1 15.2
Intra-Group Procurement Ratio 11.7 6.4 14.8 8.1 9.1 4.9
Intra-Group Directorships 8.6 4.2 11.4 4.7 6.0 3.7
Intra-Group Lending 6.9 2.3 - - - -
Average for Big 6










Table 3:  Survey on Costs and Benefits of Cross-Shareholdings 
   In bold: response with the deepest drops or increases  







Stable stock price due to long-term holdings 69.9 55.2
Long-term trade relations with the stable shareholders 52.3 42.9
Protection from hostile takeovers 33.0 36.8
Easier issue of new shares thanks to underwriting by stable shareholders 5.3 3.8
Long-term capital gains through stable holdings 4.8 0.9
Lower financing costs due to lower dividends 1.6 1.8
No merit 2.2 9.3
Demerits of Cross-Shareholdings
Hidden capital losses should share price fall 58.6 41.1
Low liquidity of funds due to pressures to hold shares long-term 37.8 40.8
Lower efficiency due to limited pressure on financing costs 11.5 19.4
Destablized stock price due to low liquidity 10.5 11.8
Limited choice and flexibility in trading partners 7.7 12.0
Reduced discipline on management due to limited shareholders influence 6.8 6.9
Increased interference in management by stable shareholders 5.4 7.2











Table 4: The Top 10 Shareholders of 8 Listed Companies, by Category of Investor 















Food Trading Electronics Chemicals Construction Finance
Investment
Banking
Tradtional Keiretsu Mitsubishi Mitsui Sumitomo Fuyō Sanwa DIK none none
Japan Trustee Services Bank 4.4 6.1 6.9 5.4 10.3 6.7 11.3 5.3
Nippon Master Trust Bank 4.3 4.6 6.7 4.4 11.2 7.3 7.3 4.0
State Street Bank&Trust 1.9 - 1.6 5.1 1.2 1.3 11.5 3.5
Chase Manhattan - - 2.4 2.0 - - 4.6 3.4
Other trusts 8.5 2.2 - - 1.3 - 3.7 5.5
Total Institutional Investors 19.1 12.9 17.6 16.9 24.0 15.3 38.4 21.7
Group Firms - 2.7 - - - 9.6 - -
Group bank - - - 2.1 3.4 2.0 - -
Group insurance companies 4.1 9.4 4.9 8.3 1.3 - - -
Total Direct Group Holdings 4.1 12.1 4.9 10.4 4.7 11.6 0.0 0.0
Other Investors - 11.9 4.1 7.7 2.4 9.7 1.5 4.2
Total Top 10 Shareholders 23.2 36.9 26.6 35.0 31.1 36.6 39.9 25.9
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